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T e "failure to mitigate"
defense in antitrust
BY THOMAS A. LAMBERT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts often state that antitrust plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate their
damages.1 But do they always? And when they do, what exactly is
required? Courts have generally glossed over these questions, and
scholarly commentary on the mitigation requirement is sparse.2 This
* Associate Professor, University of Missouri Law School, and Senior
Fellow, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute.
See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 558 (7th Cir. 1986);
Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 436 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Of course, an
antitrust plaintiff, like other injured parties, must mitigate damages"); Mal-
colm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 863 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) ("[A]n
antitrust victim must seek to minimize the amount of his damages"); Borger
v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1980); Golf City, Inc. v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1977) ("An antitrust
plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages"); Triebwasser & Katz v. AT&T Co.,
535 F.2d 1356, 1360 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[It is apparent that the [antitrust] plain-
tiffs have an obligation to mitigate their damages"); Creative Copier Servs. v.
Xerox Corp., 2005 WL 2175138, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 2, 2005); In re Visa
Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 2003 WL 1712568, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
1, 2003).
2 Two law review articles address the mitigation requirement. See
Amanda Kay Esquibel, The Rule of Avoidable Consequences in Antitrust Cases: A
© 2006 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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article sets forth some guidelines concerning when courts should
impose a mitigation duty-or, more precisely, when they should
allow antitrust defendants to assert a "failure to mitigate" argument
in order to reduce the amount of damages owed to plaintiffs who suc-
ceed in establishing liability.3
The article begins with the premise that any failure to mitigate
defense should aim to minimize the sum of three costs: the costs asso-
ciated with inefficient behavior by defendants, the costs associated
with inefficient behavior by plaintiffs, and the administrative costs of
claim adjudication. If cost minimization is the goal, then whether a
failure to mitigate defense exists, and the content of the antitrust
plaintiff's mitigation requirement, should differ depending on the
type of damages the plaintiff is seeking to recover. The bulk of this
article discusses how the defense should apply to different damages
claims.
The article proceeds as follows: part II sets up the model by
briefly outlining the three sources of social cost affected by recogni-
tion of a failure to mitigate defense and the three types of damages
antitrust plaintiffs typically seek to recover. Parts III, IV, and V then
consider how a failure to mitigate defense would affect the relevant
social costs in each of the three damages contexts. I conclude that
courts should not recognize a failure to mitigate defense when the
antitrust plaintiff is seeking to recover overcharge damages but
should do so when the plaintiff is seeking recovery of lost profits,
even if the profit losses are the result of alleged market foreclosure.
Law and Economics Approach, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 891 (1998); Neil Hamilton &
Virginia B. Cone, Mitigation of Antitrust Damages, 66 OR. L. REV. 339, 340
(1987). A third briefly addresses the duty to mitigate in connection with its
consideration of how to value lost opportunities. See William B. Tye &
Stephen H. Kalos, Antitrust Damages from Lost Opportunities, 41 ANTITRUST
BULL. 637 (1996).
3 The so-called duty to mitigate antitrust damages is not a true legal
duty but is instead "a damages rule that limits damages that a plaintiff may
recover." Esquibel, supra note 2, at 891. See also Malcolm, 642 F.2d at 863 n.30
(noting that "duty to mitigate" is actually rule of damage apportionment).
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II. THE MODEL
Recognition of a failure to mitigate defense is likely to have different
effects in different contexts. This article assumes that courts deciding
whether to permit such a defense (and, if so, what it should consist of)
should seek to minimize social costs. Accordingly, we begin by consid-
ering the types of costs a failure to mitigate defense may create or elimi-
nate and the different contexts in which such a defense might be
asserted. Parts I, IV, and V, then, will consider, context by context, the
efficiency effects of recognizing a failure to mitigate defense.
A. The relevant social costs
A failure to mitigate defense denies antitrust plaintiffs the right to
recover damages that they could have avoided using reasonable
effort. Consistent with the normal proof burdens applicable in civil
cases, the defendant bears the burden of proving both the fact that the
plaintiff failed to use reasonable care to avoid damages and the quan-
tum of claimed damages that could have been avoided had the plain-
tiff used such care.4 The most obvious effect of recognizing a failure to
mitigate defense, then, would be to alter the administrative costs-
i.e.., the sum of decision costs and error costs-associated with adjudi-
cating antitrust claims. To the extent recognition of the defense
simply adds inquiries to the process of ascertaining damages, it will
tend to increase administrative costs. If, however, the defense some-
how assists courts with the difficult task of sifting pro- from anticom-
petitive behavior, it may actually reduce administrative costs.
Recognition of a failure to mitigate defense is also likely to affect
the behavior of the parties. Potential antitrust defendants may engage
in more liability-creating behavior if they know they can reduce their
expected penalties by invoking the failure to mitigate defense. And, of
course, plaintiffs may act differently after an antitrust violation occurs
if they know they will not be able to recover damages that they could
have avoided using reasonable effort. Recognition of a failure to miti-
gate defense is therefore likely to alter (1) the administrative costs of
adjudicating antitrust claims, (2) defendants' ex ante behavior (and the
resulting social costs), and (3) plaintiffs' ex post behavior (and the
4 See, e.g., Malcolm, 642 F.2d at 863.
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resulting social costs). How the defense will affect these three cate-
gories of social cost will differ depending on the type of damages
claim being asserted. Accordingly, we must consider the various types
of damages private antitrust plaintiffs may seek to recover.
B. The types of private antitrust damages
In general, antitrust plaintiffs seek to recover damages for one of
two types of injury. "Overcharge" injury consists of an overcharge or
undercharge that the plaintiff suffers in its dealings with the defen-
dant.5 When the violation at issue is a conspiracy to fix prices above
competitive levels, for example, the plaintiff's claim is that it had to
pay more than it would have paid absent defendant's anticompetitive
conduct-a literal overcharge. When the violation is a conspiracy
among buyers to depress prices below competitive levels, the seller
plaintiff claims that the buyer defendant paid less than it would have
but for the anticompetitive behavior. 6 The distinguishing feature of
overcharge claims is that the plaintiff is seeking to recover an eco-
nomic benefit it lost in its dealings directly with the defendant.
The other main category of antitrust damages claims focuses on a
business plaintiff's decreased profits.7 A plaintiff asserting a "lost
profits" claim ultimately emphasizes the degree to which its profits
on business dealings with others were adversely impacted by the
defendant's behavior. Thus, in a lost profits case, the plaintiff claims:
"The profits I was able to secure from others were reduced by $x
because of defendant's anticompetitive behavior."8
5 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 670-89 (3d ed. 2005) (cataloguing types of
antitrust damage claims).
6 As Professor Hovenkamp observes, "The term 'overcharge injury'
may also describe the injury suffered by a seller for whom the price was sup-
pressed by a monopsonist or buyer's cartel, or the injury suffered by the pur-
chaser of an illegally tied product." Id. at 670.
7 Id. at 678.
Id. (observing that "[t]he basis of the loss may be a reduction in market
share, a smaller markup per unit sold, an existing firm's loss of investment or
business assets, or preclusion from entry into a profitable business").
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Consumer plaintiffs, who normally do not suffer lost profits, gen-
erally seek to recover overcharges. Competitor plaintiffs, who nor-
mally do not purchase goods or services from their defendants,
generally pursue lost profits. For plaintiffs who are businesses that
utilize a defendant's products or services (i.e., business customers,
rather than end-user consumers), the appropriate damages measure
will likely depend on whether the defendant ultimately did conduct
business with the plaintiff, albeit on noncompetitive price terms. If so,
as when a business plaintiff bought an input from a defendant at a
supracompetitive price resulting from horizontal price fixing, over-
charge is probably the proper measure;9 if not, as in a concerted
refusal to deal case involving wrongful dealer termination, lost profits
would likely be appropriate. 10
Within the category of lost profits, there are a couple of subcate-
gories: lost profits resulting from the increased costs occasioned by
the defendant's conduct, and lost profits resulting from market fore-
closure. The first subcategory would include, for example, the losses
resulting when a supplier defendant engages in a concerted refusal to
supply a plaintiff business with a necessary input, and the plaintiff
has to utilize an inferior supply source (or is driven out of business).,
The second would include, for instance, the lost business a competitor
plaintiff suffers as a result of its defendant's exclusive dealing agree-
ment.12 Of course, this second subcategory is, to some degree, a subset
9 But see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXEcunON 73 (2005) (arguing for lost profits measure).
10 If the product or service utilized by the plaintiff were available at a
supracompetitive price, then the plaintiff could avoid losing profits by paying
the amount of the overcharge. Because plaintiffs' damages (prior to trebling)
would be the amount of the overcharge plus interest, cash-strapped plaintiffs
could borrow the amount needed for the overcharge.
1 See, e.g., Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 863 (5th Cir. Unit
B Apr. 1981) (plaintiff claimed profit losses resulting from denial of input).
12 See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 157-60 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (discussing plaintiff's exclusive dealing claims); United States v.
Dentsply Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). While the plaintiff in Dentsply
was the government, not a competitor seeking lost profits, the facts of the case
nicely illustrate the theory of lost profits occasioned by market foreclosure.
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of the first, for market foreclosure ultimately raises the cost of doing
business by, for example, preventing the plaintiff from achieving
economies of scale or relegating it to more costly distribution chan-
nels.13 It is convenient, though, to draw a distinction between the
"'raised cost" and "foreclosure" subcategories of lost profits cases and
to limit the former to those cases in which the plaintiff's costs are
increased because of something other than market foreclosure.
Ultimately, then, we can identify three categories of antitrust
damages: (1) losses from overcharges, (2) lost profits resulting from
the increased costs occasioned by the defendant's behavior (typically,
the denial of an input) but not relating to market foreclosure, and (3)
lost profits resulting from market foreclosure. The remainder of this
article details how the mitigation duty should vary, depending on the
type of damages the plaintiff is seeking to recover.
III. THE DEFENSE IN OVERCHARGE CASES
We begin with the easiest context-overcharge injuries. 14 In the-
ory at least, a plaintiff complaining of this sort of injury could miti-
gate his damages by purchasing the next-best product or service, as
long as his welfare loss from utilizing that substitute would be less
than the amount of the overcharge. Courts generally have not recog-
nized a failure to mitigate defense in this context? 5 and for good rea-
son: all three of the relevant social costs would increase if such a
defense were permitted in this context.
13 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56
STAN. L. REv. 253, 321-22 (2003) (detailing how market foreclosure may raise
rivals' costs).
14 Recall that I am using the term "overcharge injury" to refer to all non-
competitive price injuries-both overcharges and undercharges. See supra
note 6.
15 See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 283,
286 (D. Minn. 1996) (denying mitigation defense when plaintiff sought under-
charge damages occasioned by buyer cartel and observing that "[iun a hori-
zontal price-fixing case, . . mitigation and offset generally do not affect the
measure of damages"). Courts that have considered the issue have
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A. Administrative costs
As explained in detail below, courts could ensure optimal deter-
rence of overcharge-creating conduct by setting overcharge damages
equal to the amount of the overcharge plus any deadweight loss occa-
sioned by the behavior at issue.'6 But that is not how they typically
measure overcharge damages. Instead, they focus solely on the
amount of overcharge.17 More specifically, they measure overcharge
damages by determining the difference between the price the plaintiff
actually paid to the defendant (or received from the defendant, in an
undercharge case) and that which he would have paid (or received)
had the defendant not engaged in the anticompetitive behavior at
issue.' 8 This is a fairly straightforward inquiry. The price plaintiff
paid or received is obviously easy to ascertain, and courts may deter-
mine the competitive price by utilizing either the "before-and-after"
method, in which competitive price is deemed to be that which pre-
vailed before and/or after the period of the defendant's anticompeti-
tive behavior, or the "yardstick" method, in which the competitive
price is determined based on the price of similar goods in markets not
affected by the anticompetitive behavior at issue. 19
Recognition of a failure to mitigate defense would substantially
complicate this inquiry. Suppose, for example, that defendant's com-
petitive price for a product was $100, the cartelized price was $125,
and the value to plaintiff (i.e., his reservation price) was $130. Then
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), in support of their rejection of any fail-
ure to mitigate defense. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Conm'n, 918 F. Supp. at
286. While that seems to be an overly broad reading of Hanover Shoe, in which
the Supreme Court refused to credit only one form of mitigation (i.e., passing
the overcharge on to downstream customers), the holding that mitigation is
not required in an overcharge case likely rests on solid policy grounds, as
explained herein.
16 See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
17 See HovENKAwM, supra note 5, at 663-66.
18 Id. at 670-72.
19 See id. at 672-78 (discussing before-and-after and yardstick methods
of measuring overcharge injuries).
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suppose that a reasonable substitute product was available for $110
and would have produced $120 of value for plaintiff. If plaintiff
bought defendant's product at the cartelized price ($125), he would
receive $5 of surplus ($130 minus $125), which is $25 less than the sur-
plus he would have received but for the anticompetitive conduct. If,
however, plaintiff purchased the substitute product for $110, he
would receive $10 of surplus ($120 minus $110), which is only $20 less
than he would have received but for the anticompetitive conduct. He
could thus mitigate his loss by $5 by engaging in a substitute transac-
tion. But, of course, it would be next to impossible for any court to fig-
ure this out. Determining what constitutes the most reasonable
substitute from a plaintiff's perspective would amount to guesswork,
and reservation prices are almost incapable of proof. A failure to miti-
gate defense would therefore involve the parties in expensive and
ultimately insoluble proof disputes that would raise administrative
costs substantially.
B. Costs resulting from defendant behavior
Recognition of a failure to mitigate defense in this context would
also increase the social costs resulting from inefficient behavior by
defendants. To see why this is so, consider the aforementioned "opti-
mal deterrence" model of antitrust damages. Assuming that the sole
purpose of damage-trebling is to account for the likelihood that viola-
tions will not be successfully detected and prosecuted (in other
words, that the probability of detection and successful prosecution is
precisely one-in-three), that model seeks to set base (pretrebled) over-
charge damages so that they exceed the defendant's gain from engag-
ing in the conduct at issue when the conduct involves a social loss,
but do not do so when the conduct enhances total social wealth-i.e.,
is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.20 If base damages are so determined, defen-
dants will be incentivized to engage in efficient conduct but to avoid
inefficient conduct.21
20 See id. at 657-63 (discussing optimal deterrence model of antitrust
damages).
21 The optimal deterrence model assumes that efficiency, not victim
compensation, is the goal of the antitrust damages determination.
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In light of this ultimate goal, the optimal deterrence model con-
cludes that the base damages amount in overcharge cases should
equal the amount of the overcharge (square 2-3-5-4 in the standard
monopoly pricing model depicted in the figure) plus the deadweight
loss occasioned by defendant's anticompetitive conduct (triangle 4-5-
6 in the figure).22
Figure














22 The figure diagrams the result of an exercise of market power. In per-
fect competition, the seller maximizes his returns by producing Q, units and
charging a price of P,. When the seller has market power as a result of either
monopoly or collusion, he maximizes his return by lowering output to Q,,
and charging a price of P,,. This has two primary effects: first, wealth is trans-
ferred from consumers to the seller, who is now charging higher per-unit
prices; second, some consumers (those located from points 4 to 6 on the
demand curve) substitute away from the seller's product to what would have
been their second choice in a competitive market. This inefficient substitution
is generally referred to as "deadweight loss," a term that should also include
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A damages rule requiring the defendant to pay only the dead-
weight loss occasioned by its anticompetitive conduct would
underdeter, for deadweight loss will typically be less than the
amount of wealth transfer from consumers to defendants, and
defendants will therefore continue to engage in inefficient, anticom-
petitive practices if they must simply pay an amount equal to the
social cost of their activity.23 By the same token, a damages rule
requiring merely the disgorgement of the overcharge would under-
deter when the conduct at issue increased the defendant's effi-
ciency, but by less than the amount of deadweight loss occasioned
by the practice. 24 Consider, for example, a competitor collaboration
that increased a defendant's efficiency by $200 but created market
power that transferred $1000 worth of surplus from consumers to
the defendant and generated $500 worth of deadweight loss. A
damages rule that merely required disgorgement of overcharge
would not deter this practice (the defendant would get $1200 in
benefit and would only have to pay $1000), even though the prac-
tice would result in a net social loss of $300 ($500 deadweight loss
minus $200 efficiency gain).
If the measure of damages in overcharge cases is set to equal the
amount of overcharge plus the deadweight loss, optimal deterrence
will be achieved. Practices that create both efficiencies and market
power will be pursued only if the efficiencies created exceed the
social loss occasioned by the practice, i.e., only if the practice at issue
is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 25 For practices that create no efficiencies,
If, for example, a practice transferred $1000 from consumers to defen-
dants and produced $500 in social loss, a rule requiring the defendant to pay
merely the social cost of his conduct ($500) would not motivate him to forgo
the cost-creating activity. To deter the conduct at issue, damages would have
to be at least $1000, the amount by which the conduct benefits the defendant.
24 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 660.
25 For example, this damages rule would deter a competitor collabora-
tion that increased defendant's efficiency by $200 but created market power
that transferred $1000 worth of surplus from consumers to the defendant and
generated deadweight loss of $500. While the collaboration would create
$1200 of benefit for the defendant, the damages rule would require him to
pay $1500, so he would not engage in the collaboration.
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such as naked price fixing, the damages award is likely to be larger
than necessary to motivate efficient behavior (simple overcharge dis-
gorgement would suffice), but overdeterrence is not a concern in
such cases.
Of course, the optimal deterrence model bears little resemblance
to the damages measure courts normally utilize in overcharge cases.
As noted above, courts typically measure overcharge damages by the
difference between the price actually paid to the defendant 26 and that
which would have prevailed under competitive conditions. 27 In other
words, courts have generally ignored deadweight loss, which is noto-
riously difficult to measure, and have simply awarded the amount of
the overcharge.
The optimal deterrence model indicates that this measure is
underdeterrent in cases in which the illegal conduct creates some effi-
ciencies for the defendant. 28 Recognition of a failure to mitigate
defense would render the measure similarly underdeterrent even
when the conduct at issue creates no such efficiencies. Consider, for
example, a naked price-fixing conspiracy that involves no efficiencies
whatsoever and results in a transfer of $1000 from consumers to pro-
ducers and a deadweight loss of $500. If the plaintiffs' expected dam-
ages were at least $1000, this conspiracy (which reduces social welfare
by $500) should be deterred. Suppose, though, that the defendant
could show that the plaintiffs could have mitigated their surplus loss
by $100 by purchasing a substitute product from another seller. If a
failure to mitigate defense reduced plaintiffs' expected damages
award to $900, then the conspiracy would not be deterred, for the
defendant would expect to earn $1000 from conduct that would create
liability of only $900. Thus, recognizing a failure to mitigate defense
to a claim of overcharge damages would likely exacerbate the under-
deterrence problem inherent in courts' standard measure of over-
charge damages and would thereby increase the social costs resulting
from inefficient behavior by defendants.
26 Or, in a monopsony undercharge case, collected by the plaintiff.
27 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
28 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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C. Costs resulting from plaintiff behavior
But what about the effect of a mitigation defense on the behavior
of plaintiffs? In tort and contract law, the failure to mitigate defense is
generally aimed at ensuring efficient conduct by the victim.29 Specifi-
cally, the law aims to incentivize plaintiffs to make the substitutions
necessary to ensure that resources are put to their highest and best
use.3 0 When it comes to antitrust plaintiffs claiming overcharge dam-
ages, though, any substitution by the victim plaintiff in response to a
violation would likely be inefficient.
To see why this is so, consider the welfare effects plaintiffs' substi-
tution away from defendants' supracompetitively priced products
would have on the parties themselves and on third parties. Such sub-
stitution creates no value for a plaintiff, for whom the substituted
product is a second-best option. If the plaintiff is compensated for the
welfare loss he experiences because of the substitution, then he will
not be worse off for having substituted, but the substitution itself cre-
ates no real value for the plaintiff. Nor would such substitution create
value for the defendant. He may benefit if, under the governing legal
rule, the substitution reduces the magnitude of the plaintiff's damage
award, but in that event, it is the legal rule, not the plaintiff's substitu-
tion, that creates value for the defendant. There is no independent
reason for the defendant to prefer substitution; indeed, the defendant
would likely prefer that the plaintiff not substitute.
Finally, the net third-party effect of substitution by the plaintiff
would be negative. While plaintiff substitution would create some
"winners" (e.g., suppliers of the substituted products) and some
"losers" (e.g., customers of the plaintiff, who will suffer if the substi-
29 See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 182,
184 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (observing that the doctrines of mitigation of
damages in contract law and avoidable consequences in tort law "are primar-
ily concerned with efforts by victims of a breach of contract or a tort, exerted
after the breach or tort has occurred, to minimize the harm").
So, for example, if a buyer were to renege on its promise to purchase a
bridge the seller was constructing, the failure to mitigate defense would
encourage the seller to stop work on the bridge and to reallocate its produc-
tive resources (labor, materials, etc.) to substitute projects. See Rockingham
County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
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tuted input is inferior), the losses to losers would exceed the gains to
winners. Prior to defendant's actions that artificially reduced output
and thereby occasioned the overcharge, resources were efficiently
allocated by having the plaintiff buy from the defendant. If a substitu-
tion were efficient, the plaintiff would have made it, for any beneficia-
ries from such substitution would have offered enough to
compensate any victims. Thus, we can confidently predict that the
positive third-party effects resulting from post-violation substitution
would be less than the negative third-party effects; otherwise, such
substitution would have occurred prior to the violation.
In short, any substitution by the plaintiff would be, on the whole,
inefficient and should not be encouraged. Indeed, such inefficient
substitution is the primary component of the deadweight loss that
results from monopoly pricing. 31 Obviously, optimal deterrence
would not be achieved if an increase in deadweight loss (from
increased substitution) resulted in a reduction of defendant's penalty.
It appears, then, that all three of the relevant social costs would
increase if a failure to mitigate defense were recognized in over-
charge cases.
IV. THE DEFENSE WHEN PLAINTIFF SEEKS PROFIT
LOSSES RESULTING FROM DENIAL OF AN INPUT
In our second category of antitrust damages, the plaintiff is not
claiming that he paid a supracompetitive price for the defendant's
product or service (either as an end-user consumer or as a business
that utilizes the product or service as an input) but that he was denied
that product or service altogether and therefore lost profits that he
otherwise would have earned. This damages measure therefore
applies to cases in which the plaintiff (1) is a profit-seeking entity, not
an individual consumer, (2) utilizes the defendant's product or ser-
vice as an input, and (3) could not have obtained the input from the
defendant by paying a supracompetitive price.32 Wrongful dealer ter-
31 See supra note 22.
32 If the plaintiff could have obtained the input by paying the defendant
a supracompetitive price, the proper measure of damages is overcharge. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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mination cases, for example, fall into this category. The key mitigation
question presented in this context is whether the defendant may
reduce the amount of damages owed to the plaintiff by proving that
the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to find a substitute for the
defendant's product or service.
Courts have provided different answers to that question. In the
majority of cases in which the issue has been squarely presented, the
court has recognized a failure to mitigate defense. 3  Representative of
this group of cases is Borger v. Yamaha International Corp.,34 in which the
plaintiff, a distributor of audio products, was terminated as a dealer
and accused the defendant manufacturer of a concerted refusal to deal.
Finding the defendant liable, the jury awarded damages to the plain-
tiff based on an instruction stating that the proper measure of damages
was the lost profits the plaintiff would have earned from the dealer-
ship had it received it.35 The Second Circuit reversed on grounds that
plaintiff's "duty to mitigate" required it to take reasonable steps to
merchandise substitute lines, so any profits that could have been gen-
erated by those efforts must be subtracted from plaintiff's damages.36
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit recently denied a mitigation defense to a
clothing manufacturer charged with terminating a dealer as part of a
vertical resale price maintenance conspiracy. In PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc.,37 the Fifth Circuit held that profits the
terminated dealer could have earned by selling substitute products
did not have to be deducted from the dealer's damages. 38 Similarly, in
33 See, e.g., Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985); Mal-
colm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981); Borger v.
Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980); Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); Creative Copier Servs. v.
Xerox Corp., 2005 WL 2175138 (D. Conn. Sept. 2, 2005); Westman Comm'n
Co. v. Hobart Corp., 541 F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Colo. 1982).
34 625 F.2d 390.
35 Id. at 398-99.
36 Id. at 399.
37 2006 WL 690946 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006), mandate stayed pending fil-
ing and disposition of petition for writ of certiorari, 2006 WL 2466835 (U.S.
Aug. 28, 2006).
1 PSKS, 2006 WL 690946 at *5.
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Trabert & Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp.,39 the Seventh Circuit
refused to credit the defendants' argument that the plaintiff jewelry
retailer, who claimed to have been terminated as part of a vertical
price-fixing conspiracy among the defendants, could have avoided
losses altogether by selling substitute watches.40
The relevant question here, of course, is whether courts should rec-
ognize a failure to mitigate defense that effectively saddles "denial of
input" plaintiffs with an obligation to seek out alternative sources of
supply. To answer that question, we return to our three sources of
social cost. Recognition of a failure to mitigate defense increases the
administrative costs of determining plaintiffs' damages, but that cost
increase is likely outweighed by cost savings from more efficient
behavior by plaintiffs and defendants.
A. Administrative costs
Absent a mitigation defense, an antitrust tribunal would normally
determine a plaintiffs lost profits by using either the familiar before-
and-after method, in which the court compares the plaintiff's profits
during the period of defendant's anticompetitive conduct with its
profits before and/or after that conduct ends, or the yardstick
method, in which the court compares the plaintiff's profits in the mar-
ket affected by the defendant's conduct with profits of similarly situ-
ated entities in other markets.41 A failure to mitigate defense would
require courts to make additional findings regarding what constitutes
"reasonable" mitigation efforts on the part of the plaintiff and what
quantum of plaintiff's alleged damages could have been avoided had
plaintiff engaged in such efforts. Recognition of the defense would
therefore raise the cost of determining damages in denial of input
cases. But those increased costs are likely offset by cost savings result-
ing from the salutary incentives created by the defense.
39 633 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1980).
40 Note that the issue in Trabert was whether, given the mitigation possibil-
ity, the plaintiff had established the fact (not the amount) of damages. See id. at 482.
41 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 680-83 (describing before-and-after
and yardstick methods for calculating lost profits).
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B. Costs resulting from plaintiff behavior
First, a failure to mitigate defense reduces the costs associated with
inefficient plaintiff behavior by encouraging plaintiffs to make efficient
use of productive resources.42 Consider, for example, a retailer that has
been wrongfully terminated as a dealer for a defendant manufacturer.
Social welfare would be enhanced if the retailer were to fill the shelf
space previously devoted to the defendant's products with substitute
merchandise, and the damages rule should therefore encourage such
replacement. A rule denying damages that could have been avoided
using reasonable efforts would provide such an incentive. Suppose,
for example, that the clothing retailer plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit's
recent PSKS case43 would have lost $10,000 in profits due to the loss of
defendant's clothing line but could have made $5000 by filling its
empty shelf space with other competing lines of clothing. If the plain-
tiff were permitted to recover its full, unmitigated profit loss (as it was
under the Fifth Circuit's ruling), then it would have no incentive to
restock the shelves with competing merchandise. If, however, the rule
were that plaintiff's damages must be reduced by the amount of profit
it could have earned retailing the next-best clothing line ($5000 in our
hypothetical), then the plaintiff would be encouraged to restock its
shelves. It would reason that if it left the shelves barren, it would end
up with $5000 total, but if it sold the best alternative line, it would end
up with $10,000 ($5000 in damages and $5000 profit from alternative
sales). A failure to mitigate defense, then, would encourage efficient
resource allocation by plaintiffs.
C. Costs resulting from defendant behavior
But what about the effect of the defense on defendants' incen-
tives? Wouldn't such a defense decrease defendants' expected penal-
ties and thereby reduce their disincentive to engage in the sort of
42 See Hamilton & Cone, supra note 2, at 368 (observing that "[r]esources are
not efficiently allocated if antitrust plaintiffs do not undertake reasonable steps to
put their resources to work in readily available, cost-effective alternatives").
43 PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 2006 WL 690646
(5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006), mandate stayed pending filing and disposition of
petition for writ of certiorari, 2006 WL 2466835 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2006).
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conduct that gives rise to denial of input claims? Almost certainly,
yes. But that's probably a good thing. Conduct that results in denial
of input claims is likely to be overdeterred by substantive antitrust
doctrine, so a doctrine that limits damages based on such claims
likely has a desirable effect on defendants' incentives.
Claims for profit losses resulting from the denial of an input com-
monly arise in connection with allegations that a defendant manufac-
turer has terminated a plaintiff dealer pursuant to a conspiracy
involving vertical resale price maintenance (VRPM).44 Because mini-
mum VRPM is per se illegal under the antitrust laws,4 5 a plaintiff that
convinces a jury that the defendant has engaged in such conduct is
automatically entitled to treble damages, even if the plaintiff can
demonstrate no anticompetitive effect. This outcome is troubling for
at least two reasons. First, many instances of VRPM are efficient (pri-
marily because such price maintenance provides a means of overcom-
ing the free-rider problem that inheres in any business involving
networks of dealers), 6 and a rule of automatic liability is therefore
overinclusive. Second, VRPM-unlike, say, horizontal price fixing,
predatory pricing, and improper patent infringement suits-is not a
"hidden" antitrust violation that might not be detected by a potential
plaintiff. The generally accepted rationale for trebling is that antitrust
violations are difficult to detect, so that a rule providing only single
damages would make such violations profitable and would thus
underdeter. 47 Because technical antitrust violations arising from
44 See, e.g., Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746 (6th Cir.
1986); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985); Borger v.
Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980); PSKS, 2006 WL 690646.
45 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400
(1911). See also Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964) ("[A]
supplier may not use coercion on its retail outlets to achieve resale price
maintenance"); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960)
(reiterating rule against minimum VRPM). Note that the U.S. Supreme
Court stayed the mandate in the Fifth Circuit's PSKS case, thereby sig-
nalling that it may revisit the per se rule against VRPM. PSKS, 2006 WL
2466835.
46 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 456-64.
47 Id. at 666.
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VRPM (and imposition of vertical nonprice restraints) are almost sure
to be detected and usually will not lead to anticompetitive harm, cur-
rent law is likely overdeterrent.4 Accordingly, reducing defendants'
expected penalties by recognizing a failure to mitigate defense in
denial of input cases likely pushes defendants' incentives in the right
direction, i.e., toward optimal deterrence.
49
V. THE DEFENSE WHEN PLAINTIFF SEEKS PROFIT LOSSES
STEMMING FROM MARKET FORECLOSURE
Finally, we come to the most difficult context-that in which the
plaintiff is claiming damages for profit losses occasioned by its foreclo-
sure from the market. This context differs from the previous one in that
the plaintiff is complaining that the defendant denied it a marketing
opportunity, not a productive input of some sort. This category will
generally include cases involving exclusive dealing,50 tying, 1 and "pur-
chase target" discounts, e.g., loyalty rebates or bundled discounts.52
48 For a persuasive proposal to confine damages-trebling to "clandes-
tine" antitrust violations, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 66-68.
49 Of course, if the denial of input results from a manufacturer-dealer
conspiracy that is not designed to maintain resale prices or impose nonprice
restraints but is instead aimed at eliminating the dealer's competitor(s), see,
e.g., Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Corp., 541 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1982)
(denial of input case in which plaintiff alleged this sort of conspiracy), the
substantive law of antitrust is probably not overdeterrent, and recognition of
a failure to mitigate defense may have an undesirable effect on the incentives
of potential defendants. A review of the reported cases suggests, though, that
this sort of denial of input case is rare and that most involve allegations of
VRPM or manufacturer imposition of nonprice restraints.
50 Exclusive dealing may result in market foreclosure because the defen-
dant contractually bars customers from purchasing the plaintiff's wares. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 436-37.
51 Tying defendants require purchasers of their monopoly tying prod-
ucts to purchase their tied products as well, thereby foreclosing competing
sellers in the tied product market. See id. at 423-24.
52 "Purchase target" discounts, which reward customers who purchase
more of their requirements from the discounter, tend to take business from
the discounter's rivals. See generally Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto, & Neil
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Mitigation in this context would consist of reasonable efforts by the
plaintiff to sell its products or services elsewhere. It would be only rea-
sonable, for example, for the operator of a moveable hot dog stand who
found himself "foreclosed" from his original Manhattan street comer to
seek out another street corner on which to sell his wares. Indeed, his
selection of the original street comer involved an opportunity cost in
the form of the forgone profits from selling on the next-best street cor-
ner, so his "foreclosure" from his original corner might be viewed as
eliminating that cost. In a lawsuit based on his foreclosure from the
original street comer, the opportunity cost eliminated by the foreclo-
sure would have to be deducted from the vendor's damages.5 3
What constitutes reasonable efforts to sell elsewhere will, of
course, differ from case to case. At a minimum, reasonable efforts
would seem to include searching for alternative markets and lower-
ing one's price to the level of marginal cost. In addition, a foreclosed
competitor should complain directly to the defendant about the fore-
closure at issue. In many cases, the small competitors most likely to
be foreclosed by a defendant's marketing practices (and most likely to
make sympathetic antitrust plaintiffs) are not the target of the defen-
dant's strategic behavior and would be granted relief if it were
requested.54 A foreclosed plaintiff might also mitigate its profit losses
W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incen-
tives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 615, 622-29 (2000). Purchase target
discounts may be structured as single-product loyalty discounts (or rebates)
or as "bundled" discounts (or rebates), in which the discount/rebate is condi-
tioned upon purchasing products from multiple product markets. See gener-
ally Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688,
1693-99 (2005) (cataloguing the types of purchase target discounts and sum-
marizing arguments as to why they may raise competitive concerns).
53 Tye & Kalos, supra note 2, at 646 ("Lost net revenues do not represent
true damages in this case because the lost revenues are offset by opportunity
costs of an equal amount. In legal parlance, it may be said that the foreclosed
competitor could have mitigated damages by the amount of opportunity costs").
See also Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 556-58 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that opportunity cost should be deducted from award of antitrust damages).
54 For example, Johnson & Johnson, Inc. ("J&J") was recently sued over
market foreclosure resulting from bundled discounts it provided on packages
of sutures (surgical stitches) and trocars (devices used in endoscopic surgery).
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by altering its business model. As Professor Crane has observed, a
plaintiff foreclosed by a bundled discount that covers products he
does not sell could seek to collaborate with other sellers of those
products to offer a competing bundle.55 And a competitor plaintiff in
any type of foreclosure case (tying, exclusive dealing, or exclusionary
discounts) could mitigate by seeking to become a supplier to the
defendant. If the plaintiff were at least as efficient a producer as the
defendant, both parties would be better off if the defendant pur-
chased the products or services at issue from the plaintiff rather than
produced them itself.5 6 Defendants, then, would likely accept good
faith supplier offers from equally (or more) efficient rivals, permitting
those rivals to continue selling their wares.57
The plaintiff, a small manufacturer of trocars, claimed that J&J's discounts
anticompetitively foreclosed it from the trocar market, for it did not manufac-
ture sutures and thus could not offer a competitive package discount. On a
motion for summary judgment, J&J successfully argued that it had responded
to the plaintiff's complaints about foreclosure by "carving out" plaintiff's
products so that customers who purchased plaintiff's products could still
qualify for J&J's discounts. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Applied Medical Resources Corp. v.
Ethicon Inc., No. 03-CV-1329 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2006) (copy on file with
author). The target of J&J's bundled discounts, it seems, was not plaintiff but
Tyco Corp., which manufactures both sutures and trocars and was engaging
in consumer-friendly bundle-to-bundle competition with J&J. Id. at 3. The
plaintiff was thus able to mitigate its damages by complaining directly to J&J.
55 See Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Pre-
dation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 31-32 (2005). See also Lambert, supra note 52, at
1746-47 (noting same mitigation possibility).
5 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 184 (1994) (noting that "greater effi-
ciency is an ideal way to overcome an 'entry barrier,"' for the more efficient,
but foreclosed, rival may begin supplying the competitor responsible for the
foreclosure); ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
403-04 (1985) (observing that monopolist engaged in tying would purchase
tied product from more efficient rivals).
57 For an example of how supplier arrangements have been used to miti-
gate the market foreclosure resulting from a rival's efficient business practice,
consider the experience of small regional airlines that in recent years have found
themselves foreclosed from the markets for their routes because of a form of
bundled discounts offered by the major air carriers. Major carriers charge far
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Having considered how a plaintiff claiming profit losses from
market foreclosure might mitigate its damages, we turn to consider
how recognition of a failure to mitigate defense in this context would
affect the three relevant social costs.
A. Administrative costs
Whereas a failure to mitigate defense would likely increase
administrative costs in the other two damages categories, recognition
of the defense in this context could actually reduce the costs of claim
adjudication by reducing error costs." To see why this is so, consider
(1) the challenge facing courts tasked with adjudicating foreclosure-
based lost profits claims and (2) how a failure to mitigate defense
could assist courts with that task.
1. THE CHALLENGE FOR COURTS The practices for which market
foreclosure plaintiffs seek to recover lost profits are, from a
competitive standpoint, "mixed bags" that may create both pro-
competitive benefits and anticompetitive costs. Tying, originally
condemned under the now-discredited leverage theory, 59 may harm
less for a bundle of flights going from departure point to hub to destination than
they would for two single flights, one from departure point to hub and another
from hub to destination. Small carriers that service only one leg of this sort of
journey tend to be foreclosed by such pricing, for they cannot compete unless
they offer the entire amount of the bundled discount on the leg they service,
and doing so would require them to price below cost. The regional airlines,
however, have not been driven out of business by the major carriers' bundled
discounts but have instead remained in business (and have thrived, in fact)
by becoming suppliers to the major carriers. See Eric Wieffering, Engine of
Change, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis), May 11, 2003, at 1D (documenting success-
ful supply relationships between small regional and major air carriers).
58 The administrative costs of claim adjudication include both decision
costs (the cost of making the decision) and error costs (the cost of mistakes).
59 Under the leverage theory, a seller with a monopoly in one product
employs tying to create a limited monopoly in a second "tied" product that is
essential to the use of the first "tying" product. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am.
v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1931) (articulating leverage
theory). The leverage theory has been largely discredited by the Chicago
school's observation that when two components are used in conjunction with
one another, there is only one final product, and, thus, only one monopoly
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competition if it is used to raise rivals' costs (by reducing their
market share and, consequently, their economies of scale), facilitate
collusion or oligopoly pricing, or create entry barriers.60 On the other
hand, tying may increase output by metering demand and
facilitating price discrimination among consumers.6 Exclusive
dealing arrangements may raise the costs of rivals by relegating them
to inferior distribution channels or by preventing them from
attaining economies of scale, 62 but such arrangements may also
provide more efficient means of allocating resources than either
vertical integration or unfettered markets.63 Similarly, single-product
loyalty discounts may raise rivals' costs if they permit the discounter
to attain enough market share to prevent rivals from attaining
economies of scale,64 and bundled discounts may exclude efficient
competitors that sell a narrower line of products than the
discounter,65 but both forms of discounting result in lower prices that
generally benefit consumers and may reflect scale and/or scope
economies. 66 Accordingly, it is often difficult for courts to determine
whether foreclosure-causing practices are, on the whole, output-
power to be exploited. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L. J. 19 (1957).
64 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 420-25. Tying may also be used to
evade rate regulation. Such evasion may or may not be anticompetitive
(depending on the competitive effect of the regulation itself) and should
probably be challenged under the law of the relevant regulatory regime, not
under antitrust law. See id. at 425-27.
61 See id. at 428-30.
62 See id. at 436-37.
63 See id. at 439-41.
64 See Tom, et al., supra note 52, at 622-27.
65 See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
("The principle anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates is that when
offered by a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a poten-
tial competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of prod-
ucts and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer").
66 See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Wel-
fare, 55 EMORY L. J. 423 (2006); Lambert, supra note 52, at 1723-24.
HeinOnline  -- 51 Antitrust Bull. 590 2006
FAILURE TO MITIGATE : 591
enhancing (in which case they should be permitted) or anti-
competitive (in which case they should be condemned).67
That difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that plaintiffs challenging
foreclosure-causing practices are not seeking to recover the social
costs occasioned by defendants' conduct but are instead focused on
recouping their own lost profits. Plaintiffs who find their profits
reduced because of foreclosure will therefore sue even if the foreclo-
sure-causing practice is entirely efficient. And, because there is likely
no useful correlation between the deadweight loss occasioned by a
defendant's foreclosure-causing practice and the amount of any com-
petitor plaintiff's lost profits, the evidentiary record in a case where
the plaintiff is seeking to recover lost profits from foreclosure is
unlikely to assist the court in segregating procompetitive from anti-
competitive practices.68 One solution to this problem would be to
eliminate competitor lawsuits based on market foreclosure and to rely
entirely on consumer overcharge suits, which would be filed only if
the foreclosure-causing practice at issue actually resulted in increased
prices. 69 But, as Professor Hovenkamp has argued, eliminating fore-
closure-based lost profits actions by competitors would eliminate an
67 See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search
for Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 345, 345 (describing diffi-
culty confronting courts seeking to distinguish competitive from exclusionary
conduct).
68 Professor Hovenkamp explains:
[T]here is probably no useful correlation between the amount of an
injured competitor's lost profits and other consequential damages,
and the amount of the monopoly overcharge and deadweight loss
caused by the defendant. An efficient practice, which produced no
monopoly overcharge and deadweight loss at all, and an inefficient,
monopolizing practice might both drive a competing firm out of busi-
ness. The victim's losses might be precisely the same whether or not
the practice was efficient. In one case, however, optimal damages
would be zero, in the other very large.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 662.
69 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 331 (1981) (proposing this rule for predatory pricing
cases). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 972 (1986).
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"early warning" system that likely benefits consumers in the long
run.70 In any event, courts continue to permit competitor lawsuits
based on market foreclosure, and they must therefore develop means
of separating the procompetitive wheat from the anticompetitive chaff.
2. HOW A FAILURE TO MITIGATE DEFENSE COULD HELP A failure to
mitigate defense could assist courts with that difficult task. To see
why, first consider what it means for foreclosure-causing conduct to
be "anticompetitive." 7 In a genuinely competitive system, each
competitor will try his hardest, and the winner will be the contestant
possessing the most superior skills, e.g., the fastest runner, the highest
vaulter, etc. In business competition, the winner should be the most
efficient producer (recognizing that both cost and quality are
elements of efficiency). If a business practice results in a "winner"
who is someone other than the most efficient producer, it is
inconsistent with genuine competition-in other words, it is
anticompetitive. A fair starting point in defining anticompetitive
conduct, then, would be Judge Posner's test for identifying
"exclusionary" conduct for section 2 purposes: such conduct is that
which is "likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's
market an equally or more efficient competitor."7 2
A number of theorists have criticized Judge Posner's test on
grounds that it would not condemn practices that exclude competi-
tors that are not currently equally efficient but would become so but
70 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MicH. L. REv.
1, 31 (1989).
71 This is a hot topic in the section 2 literature, in which commentators
have articulated several tests for identifying "exclusionary' conduct under
section 2. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72
U. CHI. L. REv. 147 (2005) (cataloguing tests for identifying exclusionary con-
duct); Elhauge, supra note 13, at 330 (proposing test for exclusionary conduct);
Symposium, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct under Section 2, 73 ANTITRUST L. J.
311 (2006). The problem similarly inheres, however, in section 1 claims based
on foreclosure-causing conduct, i.e., exclusive dealing and tying. Under both
statutory provisions, courts' ultimate goal should be to condemn practices
that deny consumers the benefit of vigorous competition, but leave alone
those practices that are consistent with competition.
72 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194-95 (2d ed. 2001).
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for the practice at issue.73 For example, if a bundled discount allowed
the discounter to capture so much market share that its rivals could
not achieve the economies of scale necessary to become as efficient as
the discounter, the discount would pass muster under Judge Posner's
test (the excluded rivals would be less efficient than the discounter),
but might still seem troubling.74 I have therefore argued elsewhere for
a test that would deem conduct anticompetitive if it could exclude a
"competitive rival," which is defined as a rival that is either as effi-
cient as the defendant or would likely become so if given the opportu-
nity to sell enough of its product to achieve the economies available at
the defendant's scale of production.75
If we start with the assumption that foreclosure-causing conduct
is anticompetitive if, but only if, it could exclude a competitive rival
(as defined above), a failure to mitigate defense could assist courts in
separating pro- from anticompetitive foreclosure-causing practices.
The defense would identify plaintiffs whose foreclosure is not occa-
sioned by truly anticompetitive conduct but is instead a result of
either "'plaintiff laziness" (i.e., plaintiff's unwillingness to compete
vigorously) or "plaintiff incompetence" (i.e., plaintiff's inability to
match its rival's efficiency upon attaining the efficiencies available at
the rival's scale).76
73 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 13, at 320-23. See also Hovenkamp, supra
note 70, at 153-55 (criticizing Posner's test on other grounds).
74 See LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141,161 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("As
a result [of defendant's bundled discounts, which expanded its market share],
LePage's [sic] manufacturing process became less efficient and its profit mar-
gins declined. In transparent tape manufacturing, large volume customers are
essential to achieving efficiencies of scale."); Lambert, supra note 52, at 1712
(discussing concern that bundled discounts may preclude rivals from attain-
ing minimum efficient scale).
75 Lambert, supra note 52, at 1740. Note that the goal of protecting rivals
that are as efficient as the defendant or are likely to become so if afforded the
opportunity to grow is largely consistent with the various competing views
on what constitutes "exclusionary" conduct for purposes of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 1741, n.217.
76 There are three possible proximate causes for profit losses a competitor
plaintiff experiences following the defendant's adoption of foreclosure-causing
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Consider plaintiffs who make no effort to respond to defendants'
adoption of foreclosure-causing practices by lowering their prices to
marginal cost, searching for alternative markets, seeking to become
suppliers to the defendants, or, in bundled discount cases, seeking to
collaborate with other sellers to create competitive offerings. If a
defendant shows that the plaintiff did not do these things and could
have mitigated its profit losses by doing so, then the court may infer
that the plaintiff's avoidable losses were not occasioned by the anti-
competitive nature of the defendant's practices but were instead the
result of the plaintiff's unwillingness to compete vigorously, i.e., of its
own laziness). The court would further the policy of vigorous compe-
tition by denying recovery for the profit losses that could have been
avoided had the plaintiff "tried harder."
But what about diligent plaintiffs whose foreclosure is not the
result of their failure to compete vigorously but is instead occasioned
by their incompetence, i.e., their inability to match the defendant's
efficiency at the defendant's scale of production? A failure to mitigate
defense could help courts identify those plaintiffs as well. The burden
would be on the defendant to show that the plaintiff's foreclosure
resulted from the fact that it was not (and could not become, produc-
ing at defendant's scale) as efficient a producer as the defendant. It
would, of course, be very difficult for the defendant to offer direct
proof of plaintiff's relative inefficiency; cost data are both difficult to
obtain and notoriously manipulable. But the defendant likely could
prove facts regarding its willingness to accept a plaintiff's supplier
offer, and those facts could provide indirect proof of the plaintiff's rel-
practices. First, some plaintiffs may simply refuse to engage in vigorous com-
petition-they may refuse to search for alternative markets or to lower their
prices from supracompetitive levels. Second, some plaintiffs may be willing to
compete vigorously but may simply be incapable of matching the defendant's
efficiency. For example, a plaintiff that lowers its price to marginal cost may
still be excluded by a more efficient competitor. Finally, some plaintiffs may
lose profits not because they are unwilling to compete vigorously or unable to
match the defendant's efficiency but because the defendant's conduct confers
an unfair advantage that cannot be overcome by a combination of hard work
and competence. Courts adjudicating claims for foreclosure-based damages
should penalize defendants to the extent plaintiff's profit loss results from the
third cause, but not to the extent that it results from the first two.
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ative inefficiency. Suppose, for example, that the defendant proved
that it offered to purchase the competitive product from plaintiff at a
price equal to defendant's marginal cost. Plaintiff's refusal to accept
this offer would suggest that the price being offered was below what
plaintiff's marginal cost would be if it were producing enough to sup-
ply the defendant-in other words, that plaintiff was not a competi-
tive rival. Or the defendant might offer proof (rebuttable by plaintiff,
of course) that it would have purchased from plaintiff at any price
lower than its (defendant's) marginal cost if plaintiff had made a
favorable supplier offer. Plaintiff's failure to make such an offer
would suggest either (1) that it knew it was a less efficient producer
than defendant, (2) that it did not exhaust all reasonable avenues for
staying in the market, or (3) that it did not believe defendant would
have accepted such an offer had it been extended. Defendant, of
course, would attempt to prevent a factfinder from drawing the third
conclusion by creating record evidence that it would have accepted a
favorable supplier offer. Thus, the failure to mitigate defense would
have the ex ante effect of encouraging the parties to create evidence
regarding their relative efficiencies.
In sum, recognition of a failure to mitigate defense to foreclosure-
based lost profits claims could help courts solve what Judge Easter-
brook has called "the puzzle of exclusionary conduct"-a puzzle that
exists because "competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike.",7
By focusing the evidentiary record on plaintiffs' competitive efforts
and the relative efficiencies of the parties, the defense would help
courts identify situations in which foreclosure occurred because of
plaintiff sloth or relative inefficiency, not because the defendant's
conduct was truly anticompetitive. The defense would thereby lower
the error costs involved in the adjudication of foreclosure-based lost
profits claims.
B. Behavior by defendants
Recognition of a failure to mitigate defense to foreclosure-based
lost profits claims would also have the salutary effect of encouraging
potential defendants to pursue novel, but procompetitive, marketing
77 Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 345.
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practices. Damage awards based on lost profits from market foreclo-
sure can be tremendous,78 and the standards for assessing liability are
fuzzy at best. 79 Because judges-much less juries-are frequently
incapable of recognizing when foreclosure-causing conduct is pro-
competitive, defendants are understandably reluctant to engage in
novel business practices that, although output-enhancing, have the
incidental effect of foreclosing competitors from marketing opportu-
nities. Given that judicial mischaracterization of such practices could
result in massive treble damages awards, businesses tend to be
unduly conservative in attempting untested marketing techniques
that could benefit consumers in the long run.80
A failure to mitigate defense could remedy this inefficient conser-
vatism by providing safe harbors for foreclosure-causing practices that
are not, on the whole, anticompetitive, i.e., that could not exclude a
rival that was at least as efficient as the defendant or could become so if
given the opportunity to capture the economies available at the defen-
dant's scale of production. If failure to mitigate were recognized as a
valid defense, a plaintiff that found itself foreclosed by a competitor
defendant's marketing practice would be expected to mitigate its dam-
ages by offering to supply the defendant with the relevant product or
service at a price equal to the plaintiffs marginal cost. If the offer price
was less than or equal to the defendant's marginal cost of producing
the product, the defendant could both avoid liability and reduce its
costs of production (or, at worst, leave them unchanged) by accepting
the offer.81 If the offer price was greater than the defendant's marginal
78 See, e.g., LePage's, 324 F.3d at 147 (upholding $68 million foreclosure-
based antitrust judgment resulting from claims challenging, inter alia, bun-
dled discounts); Gary Young, $519 Million Antitrust Judgment: Hill-Rom Claims
Verdict Will Not Stand, NAT'L J., Oct. 2, 2002, at A9 (detailing large antitrust
verdict resulting from foreclosure-based claim).
79 See generally Elhauge, supra note 13, at 253-54 (discussing "vacuous"
nature of monopolization standards used by courts).
80 Id. at 266-67 (noting that "[t]hese sorts of risks cannot help but chill
investments to create product offerings with a sufficient quality or cost
advantage over preexisting market options to enjoy monopoly power").
81 There could be no liability, for the plaintiff would not be foreclosed.
And the defendant's costs of production would decrease by the extent of the
plaintiff's efficiency advantage.
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cost, the defendant could point to that fact to establish that its conduct,
although foreclosure-causing, was not excluding a competitive rival
and thus was not anticompetitive. A failure to mitigate defense could
thereby help counter defendants' understandable conservatism toward
output-enhancing marketing practices that have the incidental effect of
foreclosing competitors." The defense would thus reduce instances of
inefficient conduct-or, more precisely, nonconduct-by defendants.
C. Behavior by plaintiffs
Finally, it should be obvious that recognition of a failure to miti-
gate defense in this context would have a salutary effect on plaintiffs'
conduct. Social welfare is enhanced if plaintiffs who are foreclosed
from a market redeploy their productive resources elsewhere, 83 and a
failure to mitigate defense would encourage them to do so. Social
welfare is further enhanced if plaintiffs who can produce a product
more efficiently than their foreclosure-causing competitors take over
production of the product for those competitors. The failure to miti-
gate defense outlined above would encourage efficient producers
who found themselves foreclosed to become suppliers to their rivals. 84
82 Consider a couple of examples of how the defense might work in prac-
tice. Suppose defendant, seeking to take advantage of economies of scope,
offers a bundled discount on products A, B, and C. The discount has the inci-
dental effect of foreclosing a business that sells product A but not products B
and C. If the smaller manufacturer is required to mitigate its damages, it will
seek to supply product A to the defendant. If the manufacturer is as efficient a
producer of product A as the defendant, the defendant will accept the manu-
facturer's supplier offer and the manufacturer will not be foreclosed. If the
manufacturer is less efficient, its foreclosure cannot have been anticompetitive.
Or consider a tying arrangement. Suppose defendant, seeking to
meter demand for its monopoly product A, ties its product B to product A.
Plaintiff, a small manufacturer of B, is foreclosed by the tie-in. If plaintiff is
required to mitigate its damages, it will seek to supply product B to the
defendant. If plaintiff is equally efficient, defendant will accept its supply
offer and plaintiff will not be foreclosed. If plaintiff is less efficient, its foreclo-
sure cannot have been anticompetitive.
83 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
84 Some might find this effect troubling, for inviting cooperation among
competitors may increase the risk of collusive output reduction. See Verizon
HeinOnline  -- 51 Antitrust Bull. 597 2006
598 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 51, No. 3/Fall 2006
VI. CONCLUSION
The oft-repeated mantra that antitrust plaintiffs have a duty to
mitigate their damages is not exactly correct. Sometimes they do, and
sometimes they don't. And that's the way it should be. This article
has attempted to set forth a simple theory for when a mitigation
duty-or, more precisely, a failure to mitigate defense-should be
recognized. If the objective of the defense is to minimize social costs,
which would include inefficient behavior by the parties and the
administrative costs of claim adjudication, then a failure to mitigate
defense should not be recognized when plaintiffs are seeking to
recover overcharges but should be recognized when plaintiffs are
seeking to recover lost profits-even if the claimed profit losses are a
result of purported market foreclosure.
Comm'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
("[C]ompelling negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme
evil of antitrust: collusion"). See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Dis-
trust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REv. 515 (2004) (arguing that a primary objective
of antitrust law is, and should be, to create distrust among competitors). But
as long as the supplier competitors are free to sell directly to the defendant's
customers, their continued presence in the market should prevent the defen-
dant from being able to cut its own production and raise prices above com-
petitive levels; if it did so, its supplier rivals would increase their production
and undersell it. The defendant might therefore cut a deal with rivals, offer-
ing to share its supracompetitive profits if the rivals would not undersell it.
But such an agreement, which would be per se illegal, would be rather easy
to identify, for output would fall, price would rise, and the seller would be
unable to articulate a valid reason for its decision to cut production. See Lam-
bert, supra note 52, at 1755-56.
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